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Abstract: Actions underpinned by the lack of academic integrity are increasingly impacting 
academic processes within the higher education sector around the world. Bribery, plagiarism and 
other forms of deception that enable students to obtain undeserved grades or degree certificates 
undermine the purpose and mission of higher education. By drawing on a large dataset obtained 
through face-to-face interviews with students in Ukraine, this paper explores the determinants of 
several forms of students’ academic misconduct and provides insights as to which groups of students 
are more likely to engage in either monetary or non-monetary corruption – information that will be 
of interest to educators, policymakers and other practitioners.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The massification of higher education around the world, although enabling access and social mobility, 
has been accompanied by number of negative trends that change the purpose and nature of the 
educational experience (Trow, 2000, Heyneman, 2013, Altbach, 2016). One such trend has been a 
growing lack of academic integrity or a rise in academic misconduct directly impacting educational 
processes and outcomes. As the demand for university degrees expanded, so did the instances of 
acquiring them through illicit means by engaging in cheating, bribery and other forms of academic 
misconduct. Although student cheating is not new in higher education (Barnes, 1904), like education 
itself it has become more widespread in the recent past The growing body of evidence shows that few 
countries, whilst preserving commitment to developing the young, have manage to escape the 
phenomenon of academic corruption in higher education (Hallak and Poisson, 2007, Sweeney, 
Despota, and Lindner, 2013, Bretag, 2016, and Denisova-Schmidt 2018a).  
Mirroring the growth in academic misconduct, the academic literature on this phenomenon has been 
steadily increasing in quantity and in the degree of analytical value since the 1990s (e.g. Chapman 
and Linder, 2016). Topics covered in the literature range from debates on definitions (Reybold, 2008) 
to examples and illustrations (Poore-Pariseau, 2009) to situational and environmental factors 
(Macfarlane and Ottewill, 2004). Some contributions have attempted to debate the students’ 
perceptions of the academic staff’s behaviour (and Kidwell, 2008), while others have focused on how 
the staff themselves perceive matters of ethical conduct (Aultman, Williams-Johnson, and Schutz, 
2009). Artino and Brown (2009), for example, explored how the students’ perceptions compare to 
those of academic staff. Yet very few studies have made attempts to investigate the determinants of 
academic misconduct in an empirical and systematic manner (for exceptions see  Armantier and Boly, 
2011 and, Katsaiti and Pecoraro, 2015).  
In part, such an omission is to be expected, given that, by its very nature, misconduct is secretive and 
therefore can be difficult to study empirically. What leaves no doubt is that it is a complex 
phenomenon that occurs within equally multifaceted systems of social networks and organisational 
structures (e.g. Rumyantseva and Denisova-Schmidt, 2015 for a Russian illustration). Despite 
existing efforts to understand the mechanics of bribery, cheating on exams and intentional plagiarism 
in practical and useful ways, much remains to be explored with regard to the antecedents to the deviant 
ways of acquiring grades or gaining admission to university. Looking into the antecedents of 
corruption would not only lay out empirically based foundations for anti-corruption policies, but also 
provide a window into understanding the contributions of the relevant agents and pave more specific 
pathways for attempts to shift entrenched negative behaviours (Denisova-Schmidt, 2018b). As above 
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mentioned studies suggest, corruption is everyone’s problem when it comes to higher education. 
Academic staff, students and institutions and even publisher producing readymade crib sheets all add 
into the pot. For analytical purpose, this paper focuses on the student side of the educational equation, 
whilst we remain (and invite the reader to do so) mindful of the contribution from the side of other 
critical stakeholders. Engaging with the student data, we explore the driving factors of the 
stakeholders who should be most interested in acquiring knowledge and skills for their development 
and future employment. The intention is to illustrate pathways for empowering and less punitive anti-
corruption measures. Focusing on corruption as a behaviour of interest, we inevitably separate 
students into more or less inclined to engage with it, thus also highlighting pockets of integrity and 
moral courage.  
Educational corruption knows no borders. Many developing and developed countries struggle with it 
(e.g. Hallak and Poisson, 2007). The empirical data for this particular study comes from Ukraine. 
Ukraine is interesting example for the study of educational corruption because it combines the status 
of one of the most corrupt countries worldwide as suggested by the Corruption Perceptions Index, 
regularly published by Transparency International (TI, 2017) with high levels of awareness and 
dissatisfaction with long-standing problems of corruption, which is often conceptualised as a 
mechanism of social injustice. Since gaining its independence from the USSR in 1991, Ukraine has 
undergone two revolutions: the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, also 
called the ‘Euromaidan’ uprising. In both cases, the primary catalyst was a popular desire to fight 
corruption and, in both cases, students were among the main driving agents. The students’ view of 
corruption within universities, hence becomes a particularly interesting focus for exploration. Why 
do students participate in corruption? Do they actively contribute? What drives them to accept and/or 
engage in corruption in their immediate surroundings? Does academic corruption have multiple 
functions (Denisova-Schmidt, 2018c)? What can be done in order to mitigate academic misconduct 
and malpractices with direct student involvement (Rumyantseva, 2005)? 
The article is organized in the following manner: in section 2, we discuss selected studies that explore 
the antecedents of corruption in higher education and other sectors. In section 3, we describe the data 
set, variables and rationale. Section 4 presents the econometric estimation and study outcomes. 
Section 5 discussing the finding and their implications for anti-corruption initiatives in universities.   
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2. What is academic corruption and what drives students to engage in it? 
The terms academic misconduct, plagiarism and academic corruption are often used to describe 
various forms of secretive, although sometimes also very open but still deviant, dishonest behaviours 
in the academic context that have damaging consequences for social institutions and society at large. 
The literature on corruption shares a common struggle to define the term in a manner sufficiently 
comprehensive to be meaningful and yet sufficiently specific to remain practical. Chapman and 
Linder (2016) offer an accurate summary of such debates in higher education literature. Transparency 
International (2017) defines corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’. But what 
of the corruption initiated by students who do not hold entrusted power or a public office? 
Heyneman’s (2013) definition of corruption as ‘the lack of academic integrity’ covers these types of 
behaviour but remains murky on what constitutes academic integrity. Van Duyne (2001) offers a 
more dynamic definition that refers to the deterioration of the process of decision making. 
Specifically, he sees corruption as ‘an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which a 
decision-maker consents to deviate or demands deviation from the criterion which should rule his or 
her decision-making, in exchange for a reward or for the promise or expectation of a reward, while 
these motives influencing his or her decision-making cannot be part of the justification of the 
decision’ (Van Duyne, 2001, p. 3). A combination of these definitions enables us to use the terms 
‘corruption’ and ‘the lack of academic integrity’ interchangeably (Denisova-Schmidt, 2018a). 
Referring to the context of higher education, Chapman and Linder (2016) provide multiple 
illustrations of corruption, which include plagiarism; exam briber, cheating, and seeking preferential 
treatment. The empirical part of this paper is focused on these forms of behaviour as our key 
dependent variables, separating them in to groups: monetary academic (bribery for grades) and non-
monetary academic corruption (deviant ways of obtaining grades without resorting to money).  
Why do some individuals choose corruption over honest dealings while others do not? What explains 
the variation in the degree of students’ engagement with bribery and other non-monetary forms of 
cheating? Researchers in various disciplines have explored this question in some detail, relying on 
experimental design. These studies help us understand the role of internalised factors (social norms 
and culture) (e.g. Barr and Serra, 2010) and external conditions, such as expected payoffs and 
foreseeing risks of getting caught (e.g. Armantier and Boly, 2011) in predicting corrupt decisions. A 
natural experiment reported by Fisman and Miguel (2007) focuses on the parking behaviours of 
United Nation officials in Manhattan before and after enforcement authorities acquired the right to 
confiscate the diplomatic license plates of violators. Although the diplomat’s country of origin was a 
strong predictor of their poor parking behaviours and disregard for parking tickets initially, this 
relationship disappeared after legal enforcements have been introduced.   
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Empirical studies that look specifically at the antecedents of academic misconduct in the context of 
higher education are fewer ( for exception see Curtis and Vardanega, 2016). Literature in this area 
has concentrated on explorations of perceptions and discussions of the ethical norms and duties of 
academic professionals. An assumption is often made that corrupt exchanges are driven by academics, 
and the students are victimised as a result. Evidence suggests that the initiators of bribes may be 
lecturers, either indirectly or directly (Denisova-Schmidt, Huber and Leontyeva, 2016a). In many 
instances, however, the initiators of misconduct in general and bribes more specifically are the 
students themselves. Shaw, Katsaiti and Pecoraro (2015) note that ‘students may participate in such 
mutually beneficial agreements if they believe better performance in education opens doors toward 
better job opportunities’ or to preserve self-image.  Barr and Serra’s (2010) UK based experimental 
study of international students has concluded that cultural norms and values of the country of origin 
have a strong influence on undergraduate students’ decision to bribe. This link however disappears 
for the post-graduate students. These authors also conclude that the longer international students stay 
in the UK, the weaker is their propensity to bribe. Hence, they raise the need to consider individual 
difference and avoid cultural stereotyping. Shaw, Katsaiti and Pecoraro’s (2015) study draws on a 
culturally homogenous (Ukrainians) student data and in confirmation of the Barr and Serra’s 
conclusion shows considerable individual variation in the levels of academic bribery. The differences 
are explained by students’ perceptions of corruption around them, past bribing behaviours and 
perceived criminality of corruption.  
In this paper, we build on the work of Shaw, Katsaiti and Pecoraro (2015) by considering bribery and 
six different types of non-monetary corruption as our outcome variables. Similar to the authors, we 
seek to establish the degree of influence of corruption perceptions and personal values. We further 
expand our considerations by including perceptions of the fairness of the job process, and the degree 
of perceived usefulness of higher education studies for equipping one for a job. We introduce the size 
of the city of origin to capture the possible impact of social networks where a student was raised. We 
introduce measures of practical constraints that can limit students’ ability to earn good grades: limited 
time, money, noise free study space. We also seek to recognise potential enablers that empower 
students to earn honest grades: hours spent on self-study and prior and current academic 
achievements.   A combination of constraints and enablers may to some degree explain academic 
corruption as a survival strategies for the students. Such detailed analysis of the cultural homogenous 
dataset allows for more nuanced understanding of the drivers of student engagement in corruption 
and hence, pinpoints the areas for well-focused anti-corruption interventions.  
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3. Research Design and Data  
 
Our empirical study was conducted in the spring of 2015 at selected public universities in Lviv. Lviv 
is a major city in the western part of Ukraine, a region with a low level of corruption in comparison 
to other regions in the country (Denisova-Schmidt and Huber, 2014; Foster, 2015; Denisova-Schmidt, 
Huber and Prytula, 2015). Lviv is home to 26 universities; our representative analysis was conducted 
at four of them. A total of 600 students participated in the study. Both genders were represented 
almost equally, with 42.2% (n=253) female students and 57.8% (n=347) male students (Table 1). The 
participating undergraduate students were all approximately the same age (19-20 years). Students 
were approached by the interviewer on their home campus. The specially trained interviewers 
engaged students in face-to-face, semi-structured interviews and asked them to fill out a questionnaire 
afterwards. The quantitative part of this data collection process serves as the basis for the current 
paper. The study was conducted completely in Ukrainian, the native language of all the persons 
involved. No language-based misunderstandings are expected. The sample includes only respondents 
studying at public universities in four main areas: social, natural and technical sciences and the 
humanities, representing a majority of all students (Table 1). We considered only students studying 
at public universities on-site with at least three to five prior semesters (2-oi kurs or 3-ii kurs). Table 
1 presents the descriptive statistics of independent variables. Table 2 provide means and standard 
deviations for measures of non-monetary corruption and Table 3 for bribery or monetary corruption.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Dependent variables  
A Likert-type scale of ordinal variables ranked “never”, “rarely”, “sometimes”, “often” and 
“always” was used to measure students’ personal experience with the following examples of 
dishonest behaviours aiming at improving one’s grades: monetary corruption, namely bribery; and 
non-monetary corruption, namely using a cheat sheet during the exam, downloading coursework 
from the internet,, buying coursework from the special agency, copying some parts of a course 
paper from the Internet,, copying somebody’s work during exam or test, resorting to emotional 
manipulation while explaining problems associated with studies, lying to a tutor about extenuating 
circumstances relevant to a piece of assessment. Descriptive statistics on frequency of personal 
experience and perception of such behaviours can be found Table 1.  
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Independent Variables and Hypotheses 
Perceptions of the issue: Previous research has shown that people who believe that everyone around 
them is corrupt are more prone to corruption and cheating (John, Loewenstein, Rick, 2014; Corbacho 
et al. 2016, Denisova-Schmidt, Huber  Prytula, 2015 and Denisova-Schmidt, Huber and Leontyeva, 
2016a). A study by Shaw, Katsaiti and Pecoraro (2015) found that perceptions of the corruption of 
others has had a positive impact on personal involvement of students in Ukraine. Hence we included 
several questions about the respondents’ perceptions on monetary and non-monetary corruption of 
other people at school, during university admission and in everyday life. The same methodology of 
defining students’ perceived corruption was used in Denisova-Schmidt, Huber and Prytula (2015).  
Formal ways of job search : Similar to the above, students who believe that job search and selection 
process is based on merit will be less prone to engage in deception and choose to study instead of 
gain knowledge and skills necessary. Using a 5-point Likert scale, we asked students to rank the 
extent to which they believe in the merit based nature of the job search process in the country.  
Negative attitude towards corruption:  In the Western world corruption is often defined as deficient 
morality (De Vries and Kim, 2011) and calls for virtuous values as the means of eradicating it. Although the 
correspondence between values and actions is not straightforward, we hypothesise that students who view 
corruption negatively are less likely to engage with it to avoid the state of cognitive dissonance resulting from 
acting against one’s convictions. In this study students have been asked to indicate their personal stance in 
relation to corruption and other dishonest behaviours by choosing between negative view and several 
other more positive or pragmatic positions (e.g. corruption as problem solving). ‘Negative’ has been 
coded as 1 to generate a dummy variable, positive and pragmatic views are the reference group.  
 
HiEd helps to get good education and good job: Students who believe that studying generates 
valuable knowledge relevant to future employment will be more inclined to earn their grades rather 
than engage in academic corruption. We have asked students to choose the primary reason for 
choosing university studies over other professional paths. ‘Good education and good job’ was coded 
as 1 with all other reasons forming a reference group.  
Gender: Several studies showed the impact of gender on corrupt behaviour. This usually ranged from 
‘good girls’ and ‘bad boys’ (Swamy, et. al. 2001; Jetter and Walker, 2015, and Dimant and Tosato, 
2017) to (rarely) significantly active female bribe-givers. The study by Shaw, Katsaiti and Pecoraro 
(2015), for example, suggests that female students show a higher propensity to bribe during exams at 
universities. Our sample includes ‘gender’ as one of the variables, with ‘males’ coded as 1.  
State Scholarship: higher education finance is Ukraine follows the binary system, where a small quota 
of academically better performing students is admitted on full scholarships as opposed to remaining 
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applicants who are entirely responsible for their tuition fees and living expenses (Erfort, Erfort  and 
Zbarazskaya, 2016).  Students who receive such state scholarships, although academically better able 
are also under constant pressure to maintain a required level of performance. This pressure may create 
an additional incentive to resort to deception or bribery as a problem solving tool, all other factors 
being equal. Hence, our dataset contains ‘state scholarship’ variable coded as 1.  
Level of Wealth: Studies show that some people are not involved in various types of corruption 
because they do not have the resources and cannot afford any additional payments and/or they do not 
know how to initiate them (Denisova-Schmidt, 2014). In our dataset, wealth is represented by two 
variables: income status of the family and students’ monthly expenditure.  We capture the Income 
Status of the Family by four dummy variables: ‘enough money for food only’, ‘enough money only 
for food and clothes’, ‘enough for food and clothes is available, but purchasing durable items might 
be problem’, ‘enough for purchasing durable goods, but purchasing very expensive items like 
apartments or cars might be a problem’. The reference group is ‘can afford almost anything’. Monthly 
expenditure (housing not included) is measured by three dummy variables: ‘less than 1000UAH’, 
‘between 1000UAH and 1600UAH’ and ‘between 1600UAH and 2000 UAH’. ‘More than 2000 UAH 
is a reference group’.    
Type of Living Accommodation: Of a particular interest here are students who live in dorms. In the 
Ukrainian context in particular, these experience higher level of day to day challenges and practical 
inconveniences with their studies. Dormitories tend to be noisy without suitable study areas and 
several students usually share a room. This can affect one’s ability to concentrate and find quiet 
place/time to study. Moreover, such places are also very social and any information as well as value 
based attitudes with regards to corrupt practices spread easily. Access to such information may be 
fuelling students’ acceptance of such practices and offer practical guidance on how to go about 
offering a bribe or not getting caught whilst cheating. Hence, we hypothesize that students who live 
in dorms will be more prone to report personal engagement with academic corruption. In our data 
set this construct is captured by two dummy variables: ‘living in dormitory’ and ‘living with 
parents’, whilst ‘rent a flat’ remains a reference group. 
Academic Performance: Higher education offers a special social status and the potential of security 
of a professional future in Ukraine. The social pressure to obtain a degree is high. As a result, about 
80% of young Ukrainians go to universities and almost all of them get their degree on time (Bastedo 
et. al., 2009; Denisova-Schmidt, Huber and Leontyeva, 2016a). Not all of them are ready to study on 
such a high level, however, and corruption is one of the ways for them to survive the academic 
pressures. Hence we added the two variables ‘external independent evaluation results’ that measures 
academic performance before admission and ‘performance during university studies’. External 
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independent evaluation or ZNO1 results in Ukrainian, are represented by 3 dummy variables: ‘below 
500’, ‘500-600’, ‘600-700’ with ‘above 700’2 being the reference group.  Performance during 
university dummies cover four categories: ‘satisfactory’, between ‘satisfactory’ and ‘good’, ‘good’; 
between ‘good and excellent’ with ‘excellent’ being the reference group.  
Part-time work: Longer working hours introduce barriers to study, hence corruption may look like an 
attractive solution to the dilemma it introduces. In Ukrainian higher education, study programmes 
tend to be overloaded with contact hours and high expectations of drill type and memorisation 
learning. Due to long existing traditions that emphasise face to face contact with students, the latter 
are expected to spend as much as 15 or more hours in the classroom, taking more than 5 subjects at 
any given term and expected to do regular homework on all of them. Those students who work part-
time are more likely to cut corners through bribing and cheating due to time constraints. In fact, 
students in Russian universities report exactly these reason when asked why they engage in academic 
misconduct (Denisova-Schmidt, 2013).  This construct is measured by three dummy variables: ‘do 
not work, ‘less than 4 hours’ and ‘between 4 and 6 hours’. ‘Over 6 hours’ is a reference group.  
Time spend on studying: Time a student spends on studying is indicative not only of the amount of 
effort and dedication he or she puts into their own learning but also a level of receptivity towards the 
types of learning that are expected of them as well as their assessment of the level of expectations as 
achievable. Hence, students who spend more time on independent study will be less prone to engaging 
with academic corruption. On the other hand, students who don’t spend time on studying but still 
desire to pass, will be more inclined to ‘solve the problem’ through dubious means. This aspect of 
academic corruption is studies in more detail in the empirical study of Russian students (Denisova-
Schmidt and Leontyeva, 2013). This construct is captured by four dummy variables: ‘none’, ‘less 
than 1 hour’, ‘1-2 hours’, -2-3 hours’, with ‘more than 3 hours per day’ being a reference group. 
Size of the city of origin: Cabelkova and Hanousek (2004) suggested initially that the size of the city 
of origin in Ukraine should have an impact on individual students’ propensity to engage with 
                                                          
1 Zovnishnie Nezalezne Otsinjuvannia (ZNO) (Engl.: External Independent Assessment) – a test that serves as both 
secondary school finals and university admission exams.  
2 ZNO results come of four sources: three subject tests plus an average mark from the secondary school. Each source can 
give minimum 100 and maximum 200 points, that is, the ZNO result lies between 400 and 800. Some additional points 
(up to 10 points) can be given for the winners of the all-Ukraine pupil Olympiads or similar competitions, however the 
number of such entrants is very limited. ZNO results below 500 can be treated as very low; results between 500 and 600 
are also considered as quite low results with almost no chances to get state placement or stipend; results between 600 and 
700 are considered good results with good chances to get state placement or stipend; results above 700 can be treated as 
excellent and, as a rule, give very high chances to get state placement or stipend.    
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corruption. Specifically, larger cities with their anonymous atmosphere would be producing more 
corrupt individuals, whereas small cities would be containing of such behaviours due to the system 
of checks and balances. However, Shaw, Katsaiti and Pecoraro (2015) have found their empirical 
evidence to contradict this with smaller cities having more of an effect on individual students’ 
propensity to get involved with corruption. Viewing corruption through the theory of collective action 
(Marquette and Peiffer, 2015) helps explain this disagreement. Larger cities in Ukraine tend to be more 
cosmopolitan and on average more educated population would be better equipped to deal with 
problems and interact with strangers without having to resort to dubious measures. Whereas, smaller 
cities and villages represent more tightly knit networks, with people being more aware of each other’s 
shortcomings which are compensated by the use to of favours.  Hence, we hypothesise that students 
from smaller municipalities are more likely to bring their corrupt habits of problems solving to their 
education process.   This construct is captured by five dummy variables: ‘more than 1 mln’, ‘city 0.5 
to 1 mln’, ‘city 0.25 to 0.5 mln’, ‘city 0.05 to 0.25 mln’, ‘city 0.02 to 0.05 mln’, ‘small city’,  with 
the smallest ‘village’ being a reference group. 
 
 
4. Methods and results  
 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for the eight dependent variables. The most frequently 
used forms of academic corruption in our dataset are: using a cheat shit during exams (mean=3.48), 
copying someone else’s work during exams (mean=3.44) and copying chapters from the internet 
when writing papers (mean=3.26). The average frequency of encounters with bribery is not very high 
but noticeable (mean=1.81).  
Table 2 presents means and standard deviations for all scale independent variables. Perception of all 
types of academic corruption is noticeably higher than the reported personal experience. The leading 
suspects, however, remain the same: using a cheat shit during exams (mean=4.18), copying somebody 
else’s work during exam (mean=4.07), and copying chapters from internet when writing a paper 
(mean=3.91). The perceived frequency of bribery is 3.5, higher than the reported experience of 1.81. 
Students believe that formal (non-corrupt) ways of job search can yield a job is fairly strong in our 
data at the mean level of 3.49.  
Table 3 contains frequencies for the independent categorical variables. Our sample contains more 
men (57%) than women and 71% of all students received state scholarships. 70% of students live in 
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dorms and 54% view corruption as a negative social phenomenon. Over 80% of students have a 
hopeful view of education as a process that is conducive towards improving oneself and one’s chances 
of a good job. Yet only 15% undertake more than 3 hours per day of independent study. Over 60% 
report studying between 1-3 hours. The most frequent average grade is good (32%) and between good 
and excellent (35.8%). 89% reported having very high ZNO scores from 600 upwards. 51% of the 
sample claim their families have enough income to afford durable goods without difficulties. Yet 
nearly 80% of students claimed that they spend under 1600 UAH on monthly basis. Most students 
don’t work during their studies (77.2%). 11.7% claim working between 4 and 6 hours a day.   
 
Regression  
 
We performed the logistic regression analyses based on regression models with ordinal variables. The 
use of linear regression with an ordinal categorical dependent variable violates the continuity and 
normality of dependent variable assumptions and causes the analysis to lose some important 
information, which could lead to ambiguous results. The explicit recognition of the ordinality of the 
dependent variable and the usage of ordinal regression helps to analyse different types of variables 
(continuous, dichotomous and ordinal) within a common statistical framework and to avoid arbitrary 
assumptions about the scale of the variables (Winship and Mare, 1984). The estimation results are 
shown in Table 2.  
As predicted by existing literature, (at the 1% level of significance) students’ perception of prevalence 
of corruption around them has a strong positive effect on the level of their personal experience with 
all the types of academic misconduct. Students who believe job search process is based on merit show 
less personal experience with bribing, ‘using a cheat sheet during the exams’, ‘downloading 
coursework from the Internet’ and ‘copying somebody’s work during examinations or tests’. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Those students who have negative attitudes toward corruption, have less experience with all types of 
academic misconduct. This result is statistically significant for bribing, ‘copying some parts of a 
course paper from the Internet’, ‘copying somebody’s work during examinations or tests’ and ‘asking 
a professor for individual treatment’. Students who believe that higher education leads to good 
education and good job are not different from the rest of the students when it comes to participating 
13 
 
in academic corruption. Male students in our dataset were on average more likely to use unauthorized 
materials during exams, buy coursework from special companies or classmates, encounter bribes (all 
significant at the 1% level) and cheat by downloading coursework from the internet, deceive a 
professor about problems associated with studies or ask them for a preferential treatment (at the 10% 
level).  The living arrangement is significant in determining some type’s of students’ misconduct:  
those who live in the dormitories are more likely to encounter bribes (significant at the 10% level) 
and use unauthorized materials during exams (significant at the 1% level). Students’ pre-admission 
academic performance (ZNO exams) has yielded mixed results. Contrary to the expected, students in 
the middle range of ZNO test scores (between 600 and 700) show highest levels of personal 
experience with bribery and buying coursework (statistically significant at 5%) and using crib sheets 
during exams (significant at 1%). Students with lower ZNO scores (between 500 and 600) show 
higher levels of personal experience with plagiarising parts of assignments using internet (significant 
at 10%). However, on the whole, ZNO scores make little different to the levels of students’ personal 
experience with corruption.  Academic performance, whilst in the university has a stronger and closer 
to expected impact on experience with most types of corruption, except for bribery. Students who 
perform at ‘satisfactory’ level report statistically significant levels of involvement with all seven 
forms of non-monetary corruption. Students at ‘between satisfactory and good’ and ‘good’ levels 
report involvement with four types of non-monetary corruption (using a cheat sheet during exams, 
downloading coursework off the internet, deceiving a professor or asking them for a preferential 
treatment). Students at ‘between good and excellent’ show a similar pattern with the exception of 
deceiving professors. 
Time investment into independent study makes a considerable difference to the degree of students’ 
personal experience with corruption. Students who spend between zero and one hour on self-study 
per day report higher levels of involvement with nearly all forms of corruption. Students who spend 
between 1-3 hours on independent study are less involved with fewer types of misconduct than the 
entirely idle groups.  On the whole is it clear that students who invest time into studying don’t need 
to resort to either bribing, cheating or plagiarism nearly as much. The importance of time is once 
again confirmed with the results for the part-time work. Students who do not work or work under 4 
hours a week have less experience of corruption in terms of ‘using a crib cheat during exams’ 
(significant at the 10% level) and ‘downloading coursework from the Internet’ (significant at the 1% 
level) compared to those who have a high working load (6-8 hours).  
As a rule, we do not find a strong relationship between students’ family wealth and academic 
misconduct. No one category of income status of the family differs significantly in its relation to any 
kind of academic dishonesty. Also, the categories of students’ spending status do not differ 
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significantly in their relation to academic dishonesty. The exception are the cases of ‘using a crib 
cheat during exams’, ‘copying some parts of a course paper from the Internet’ and ‘copying 
somebody’s work during examinations or tests’, where lower spending (less than 1,000 UAH and 
between 1,000 and 1,600 UAH) indicate lower personal experience in corresponding type of 
academic dishonesty (at the 5% level of significance).  Students from large cities (with a population 
of 1 million and above) indicate less academic dishonesty than students from villages for all 
dependent variables, although the results are not always statistically significant. .  
 
5. Discussion  
The growth and diversification of higher education systems around the world has been accompanied 
by increasing practices of academic corruption enacted, promoted but also resisted by various 
stakeholders of the academic process (Hallak and Poisson, 2007, Sweeney, Despota, and Lindner, 2013, 
Bretag, 2016). This study makes a contribution to a small but growing body of literature (e.g. Shaw, 
Katsaiti and Pecoraro, 2015) that explores the driving factors of academic corruption practices form 
the student side of the educational equation. The focus on the students’ involvement does not 
downplay or negate the contributions that other stakeholders inevitably bring to the table by either 
demanding bribes, colluding or turning a blind eye onto student plagiarism. Instead it recognised that 
students are equal actors of the educational process and have their own motivations and constraints 
that contribute to their decision to engage or abstain/resist corruption behaviours. Understanding 
students’ views and specific circumstances facilitates development of anti-corruption measures that 
would empower the students to actively join the anti-corruption movement and building of the culture 
of academic integrity.  
The outcomes of the study demonstrate that complex interplay between personal values, perceptions 
of actions of others and practical pressures and constraints all play a role in student engagement with 
academic corruption to a different extent. As the shadow cannot exist without the light, corruption 
co-exists side by side with student self-restraint and active resistance to cheating and deception. The 
national context of Ukraine in this study is of a particular significance, as Ukraine is recognised as a 
highly corrupt country (TI cite) on the one hand, but also the country that has actively and visibly 
struggled against corruption in the recent years (Halushka, 2018). However, given high levels of 
academic misconduct and student mobility worldwide they are equally relevant to societies beyond 
the post-soviet landscape.  Together with understanding of what contributes to students’ involvement, 
this study localises pockets of integrity that can and should be harnessed for constructive anti-
corruption action. The recent research on anti-corruption approaches suggests that it may be more 
efficient to focus on fighting specific types of malpractices rather than generalized corruption itself 
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(e.g. Shekshnia, Ledeneva, and Denisova-Schmidt 2017; Denisova-Schmidt, 2018b). To understand 
the specifics we have asked the question: what drives/constraints student engagement with seven 
forms of academic corruption? We discuss our findings along with the policy implications in the 4 
sections below.  
Values and perceptions  
Our study echoes previous findings that connected perception of corruption of others with individual 
levels of engagement (John, Loewenstein, Rick, 2004, Corbacho et al. 2016, and Shaw, Katsaiti and 
Pecoraro, 2015). Observing their relatives, friends, teachers, politician’s self-serving and non-
transparent actions, students adopt these behaviours for themselves. However, personal values that 
mark corruption as negative have a constraining effect on student engagement with all types of 
academic misconduct, a link previously established by Shaw, Katsaiti and Pecorar (2015) for student 
bribing behaviours.  Combining anti-corruption initiatives that seek to influence collective 
perceptions of existing levels of corruption with educational approaches advocated by Wood and 
Antonowicz (2011) have the power to transform student engagement with academic corruption. What 
is more, such efforts can be actively identifying and drafting students who already have negative view 
of corruption to become stewards of academic integrity in a peer to peer format. Similarly to Shaw, 
Katsaiti and Pecorar (2015), the current study identifies students from larger cities as less prone to 
engagement with various forms of corruption, likely reflecting the cosmopolitan values and looser 
social networks. University administrators and policy makers can further draw on this student 
population when crafting programmes that promote academic integrity.   The findings remain mixed 
with regards to gender with Shaw, Katsaiti and Pecorar (2015) reporting female students as the major 
suspects, whereas the present study is more in line with   previous ‘good girls’/’bad boys’ conclusions 
(Swamy, et. al. 2001;  Jetter and Walker, 2015; and Dimant and Tosato, 2017) It is therefore, 
advisable not to rely on gender alone when identifying potential stewards of integrity.  
Such value driven and perception based initiatives, however are unlikely to yield desired outcomes 
in their own right. By looking into student circumstances, this study expanded on the work of Shaw, 
Katsaiti and Pecorar (2015) and identified three groups of students that will benefit from additional 
financial investments, improved infrastructure and changes to the admissions process before they can 
be expected to give up dishonest behaviours. These include students who live in dorms, academically 
unprepared students and students who work over 6 hours a week.  
Dormitory living  
Students living in dormitories are more likely to resort to cheating than those who live with their 
parents or rent private accommodation. These students face harsher practical demands on their time 
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due to the need to solve everyday problems (shopping, cooking, cleaning, etc.) and may have less 
time and energy for studying. Many dormitories worldwide and in Ukraine specifically do not 
guarantee quiet study spaces and instead students have to exist in a perpetual party universe. Material 
investments in the infrastructure are needed to make dorms conducive to the academic culture. The 
flipside of the social nature of dorm living is that these are probably the best-informed students when 
it comes to possible cheating techniques. Equally, however, dorms can be converted into fruitful hubs 
for spreading positive individual values around integrity and creative subcultures that take pride in 
honest academic work. Hence, to re-set the negative cycle, re-configurations and improvements to 
the physical structures should be accompanied by infusion of values of higher academic integrity, 
honesty and negative conceptualisations of corruption.   
Engaging in self-study   
Students who spend little time on self-guided study are more likely to use various cheating techniques. 
Pressures of academic demands at the university generate a survival need through quick-fix solutions 
offered by cheating and bribery. Many students consider university studies to be a pathway to a formal 
credential rather than a pursuit of knowledge (Polese at al., 2018). For many countries, more rigorous 
selection mechanisms, such as writing a statement of purpose, will weed out some of these students 
from the start. When recruiting international students, pre-selection stage might be partly outsourced 
and conducted in cooperation with domestic partners, as is currently being performed by the German 
Akademische Prüfstelle (APS, established in 2001) for students from China, Vietnam and Mongolia 
applying for a student visa in Germany, Austria, Belgium and Switzerland. Almost all student 
candidates undergo this procedure, which involves the verification of academic certificates and an 
interview on the field of study, as well as a fee (about 300 USD).  
Frequent and surprise assessment can be used to remind students that they are expected to study 
regularly and thus boost their levels of academic engagement. At a broader policy level, continuing 
popularisation of the vocational track in the already very diverse higher education system in Ukraine 
specifically (Rumyantseva and Logvynenko, 2018) provides an alternative outlet for students who 
are less comfortable with more rigorous demands in higher education.  The academically stronger 
students can be drafted into part-time employment as academic engagement champions to inspire and 
motivate those who struggle. With adequate preparation and training, such mini partnerships may not 
only spread academic knowledge but also promote positive attitude towards studying and negative 
views of those who undermine these efforts through cheating. In addition to these progressive 
measures, anti-plagiarism anti-bribery discussions should be a mandatory part of a university’s 
introduction week and/or should be integrated into the curriculum for all incoming students. These 
types of courses have the capacity to increase student awareness of academic integrity significantly, 
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even in less corrupt countries like Australia (Curtis et al. 2013). Faculty members should be explicitly 
articulating their expectations in terms of academic integrity, acknowledging the diversity of 
academic and cultural backgrounds of their students and the need to come to a common denominator 
at the same time. The punitive measure, however, should be only used in a careful combination with 
more aspirational and developmental approaches to have a constructive developmental impact (de 
Jager and Brown, 2010).  
Working excessive hours  
One additional problematic group are the students who work over six hours per week. They are 
particularly likely to engage in non-monetary corruption. Previous research has documented a 
negative impact of part-time jobs on academic achievement (Salamonson and Andrew, 2006). 
Students in our sample, however, resort to cheating to boost their marks. This represents a difficult 
dilemma for both the universities and the students. Certain groups of students may not be able to 
afford studying without investing substantial amounts of their time into earning a living. Means tested 
scholarships or grants offered either by institutions or the governments would reduce some of the 
stress. Further academic counselling may be helpful to assist students with decision making and 
prioritising their studies.  
Regardless of one’s reasons for engaging in academic corruption, however, this phenomenon remains 
destructive and undesirable. To some extent and in the extreme cases public ostracism of the violators 
might be advisable: one Chinese student at Bath University in the United Kingdom who wanted to 
bribe his professor for a better mark brought 5,000 GBP and a loaded air pistol. The student was 
arrested, convicted and sentenced to jail in a story that was widely discussed in the media (University 
of Bath Student Jailed, BBC News, 2013). This example might be very instructive for other young 
people thinking of ‘negotiating’ marks via bribery. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Although corruption in higher education is common in many countries around the world, we do not 
know enough about factors that drive individuals to engage with it. This paper adds to the small body 
of literature that recognised the importance of individual variation depending on one’s levels of 
corruption perception, moral stance on corruption and a series of practical constraints on one’s time, 
living conditions that may or may not be conducive to studying, willingness to study independently, 
gender, and the size of city of origin.   
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The findings are useful to scholars of academic corruption as well as policy makers in pointing out 
to pockets where interventions are most needed as well as pockets of integrity from which resources 
can be drawn to revert the culture of cheating and bribery.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. Dependent variables. 
Violation of academic integrity by personal experience in the following actions  
(from 1 - never to 5 – systematically)  
 Areas Actions Observat
ions 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Non-monetary 
corruption: 
 
Taking exams 
Using a cheat sheet during the exams 
599 3.48 1.14 
Copying somebody’s work during 
examinations or tests 593 3.44 1.12 
Non-monetary 
corruption: 
 
Writing papers 
Downloading a course paper (or other written 
work) from the Internet 600 2.25 1.22 
Buying a course paper (or other written work) 
from the special companies or classmates 599 1.76 1.11 
Writing a paper on one’s own, but copying and 
pasting some chapters from the Internet 599 3.26 1.11 
Non-monetary 
corruption: 
 
Communicating with 
the professor 
Deceiving a professor while explaining 
problems associated with studies 598 2.32 1.22 
Asking a professor for an individual approach  
600 1.62 0.98 
Monetary corruption: 
 
Bribe 
Encountered bribes at universities 
598 1.81 1.00 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics. Independent scale variables. 
Violation of academic integrity by general perception in the following actions  
(from 1 - never to 5 – systematically)  
 Areas Actions Observat
ions 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Non-monetary 
corruption: 
 
Taking exams 
Using a cheat sheet during the exams 
597 4.18 0.74 
Copying somebody’s work during 
examinations or tests 594 4.07 0.84 
Non-monetary 
corruption: 
 
Writing papers 
Downloading a course paper (or other written 
work) from the Internet 595 3.56 0.96 
Buying a course paper (or other written work) 
from the special companies or classmates 593 3.28 1.07 
Writing a paper on one’s own, but copying and 
pasting some chapters from the Internet 595 3.91 0.92 
Non-monetary 
corruption: 
 
Communicating with 
the professor 
Deceiving a professor while explaining 
problems associated with studies 599 3.23 1.04 
Asking a professor for an individual approach  
598 2.60 1.13 
Monetary corruption: 
 
Bribe 
Encountered bribes at universities 
597 3.50 0.97 
 
Formal ways of job searching 597 3.49 0.94 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics. Independent categorical variables. 
Number of cases Number of cases 600 
Gender Male 57.8% 
 Female 42.2% 
Form of education State stipend 71% 
 Own costs 29% 
Place of origin City, more than 1 mln pop 9% 
 City, 0.5 to 1 mln pop 13% 
 City, 0.25 to 0.5 mln pop 8.2% 
 City, 0.05 to 0.25 mln pop 13% 
 City, 0.02 to 0.05 mln pop 23.1% 
 Small city 14% 
 Village 19.6% 
What are the most frequent marks you Satisfactory 6.2% 
get at the university? Between Satisfactory and Good 19.2% 
 Good 32% 
 Between Good and Excellent 35.8% 
 Excellent 6.8% 
How many hours per day do you spend for  None 4.3% 
self-study/homework/preparation to classes? Less than 1 hour 16.2% 
 1-2 hours 37.5% 
 2-3 hours 26.7% 
 More than 3 hours 15.2% 
Income status of the family Enough for food only  0.5% 
 Enough for food and closing 7.2% 
 Not enough for durable goods 34.7% 
 Enough for durable goods 51% 
 Enough for everything 6.5% 
How much do you spend monthly Less than 1000 UAH 42% 
(housing not included)? Between 1000 and 1600 UAH 37.3% 
 Between 1600 and 2000 UAH 13.2% 
 More than 2000 UAH 7.3% 
Where do you live? Dormitory 70% 
 With parents/relatives 19.2% 
 Rent a flat 9.5% 
What was you External Independent Evaluation Less than 500 0.3% 
result? Between 500 and 600 7.2% 
 Between 600 and 700 41% 
 More than 700 48% 
 Missing 3.5% 
Do you work and, if yes, how many hours per day Do not work 77.2% 
is you average working load? Less than 4 hours 9.7% 
 4-6 hours 11.7% 
 6-8 hours 1.5% 
Negative attitude toward corruption Negative 54% 
 Other 46% 
HiEd helps to get good education and good job Agree 81.5% 
 No 18.5% 
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Table 4: PLUM regression estimation results 
 Monetary 
Corruption-
Bribery 
Non-monetary corruption 
 
 
Dependent variable 
  
Personal 
experience 
with bribes 
Using a cheat 
sheet during 
the exams, 
personal 
experience 
Downloading 
coursework 
from the 
Internet, 
personal 
experience 
Buying 
coursework 
from the special 
companies 
or classmates, 
personal 
experience 
Perception of the issue (scale variable) 
0.405*** 
(0.055) 
0.927*** 
(0.079) 
0.570*** 
(0.056) 
0.289*** 
(0.048) 
Formal ways of job search (scale variable) 
-0.136** 
(0.058) 
-0.204*** 
(0.064) 
-0.096* 
(0.057) 
0.005 
(0.057) 
Negative attitude toward corruption (dummy 
variable) 
-0.211** 
(0.097) 
-0.173 
(0.103) 
-0.094 
(0.096) 
-0.080 
(0.096) 
HiEd helps to get good education and good 
job (dummy variable) 
0.060 
(0.131) 
0.118 
(0.147) 
0.138 
(0.133) 
-0.080 
(0.131) 
Male Gender (dummy variable) 
0.312*** 
(0.105) 
-0.327*** 
(0.115) 
0.178* 
(0.105) 
0.290*** 
(0.106) 
State stipend (dummy variable) 
0.051 
(0.118) 
-0.070 
(0.130) 
0.065 
(0.118) 
0.058 
(0.117) 
Income status of the family (“Enough for everything” is a reference group): 
Enough for food only  0.882 
(0.817) 
-0.900 
(0.847) 
-0.431 
(0.873) 
-2.362 
(15.374) 
Enough for food and closing 0.341 
(0.283) 
0.386 
(0.300) 
-0.140 
(0.275) 
-0.396 
(0.275) 
Not enough for durable goods 0.163 
(0.223) 
0.240 
(0.228) 
-0.238 
(0.210) 
-0.262 
(0.209) 
Enough for durable goods 0.378* 
(0.218) 
0.163 
(0.220) 
0.140 
(0.203) 
-0.232 
(0.202) 
How much do you spend monthly (housing not included)? (“More than 2000 UAH” is a reference group): 
Less than 1000 UAH 
-0.270 
(0.206) 
-0.474** 
(0.235) 
-0.058 
(0.206) 
-0.121 
(0.205) 
Between 1000 and 1600 UAH 
-0.096 
(0.200) 
-0.628*** 
(0.229) 
0.065 
(0.201) 
0.038 
(0.200) 
Between 1600 and 2000 UAH 
0.076 
(0.224) 
-0.235 
(0.257) 
-0.061 
(0.226) 
-0.132 
(0.224) 
Where do you live? (“Rent a flat” is a reference group): 
Dormitory 
0.318* 
(0.188) 
0.505*** 
(0.196) 
0.125 
(0.182) 
0.267 
(0.188) 
With parents/relatives 
0.149 
(0.215) 
0.362* 
(0.220) 
0.081 
(0.205) 
0.247 
(0.212) 
What was you External Independent Evaluation result? (“More than 700” is a reference group): 
Less than 500 0.503 
(0.780) 
0.438 
(0.819) 
0.341 
(0.773) 
-0.016 
(0.766) 
Between 500 and 600 0.322 
(0.210) 
0.455* 
(0.248) 
0.388* 
(0.216) 
0.231 
(0.212) 
Between 600 and 700 0.237** 
(0.113) 
0.337*** 
(0.124) 
0.119 
(0.114) 
0.231** 
(0.113) 
Do you work and, if yes, how many hours per day is you average working load? (“6-8 hours” is a reference 
group): 
Do not work -0.133 
(0.396) 
-0.861* 
(0.345) 
-1.670*** 
(0.457) 
-0.493 
(0.402) 
28 
 
Less than 4 hours -0.240 
(0.420) 
-0.923* 
(0.508) 
-1.944*** 
(0.479) 
-0.427 
(0.317) 
4-6 hours 0.054 
(0.412) 
-0.792 
(0.501) 
-1.468*** 
(0.471) 
-0.353 
(0.417) 
Do not participate in an NGO or sport club 
dummy 
-0.132 
(0.100) 
-0.013 
(0.110) 
0.055 
(0.100) 
0.043 
(0.100) 
What are the most frequent marks you get at the university? (“Excellent” is a reference group): 
Satisfactory 
0.219 
(0.296) 
1.422*** 
(0.345) 
1.260*** 
(0.310) 
0.872*** 
(0.301) 
Between Satisfactory and Good 
0.179 
(0.238) 
0.653*** 
(0.252) 
0.522** 
(0.237) 
0.377 
(0.237) 
Good 
0.183 
(0.220) 
0.798*** 
(0.230) 
0.563*** 
(0.218) 
0.344 
(0.220) 
Between Good and Excellent 
0.123 
(0.210) 
0.414* 
(0.215) 
0.396* 
(0.206) 
0.232 
(0.210) 
How many hours per day do you spend for self study/homework/preparation to classes? (“More than 3 
hour” is a reference group): 
None 
0.833*** 
(0.277) 
0.887*** 
(0.338) 
0.979*** 
(0.307) 
0.779*** 
(0.282) 
Less than 1 hour 
0.459** 
(0.197) 
0.876*** 
(0.220) 
0.707*** 
(0.196) 
0.496** 
(0.194) 
1-2 hours 
0.288* 
(0.161) 
0.572*** 
(0.169) 
0.322* 
(0.156) 
0.208 
(0.186) 
2-3 hours 
0.252 
(0.165) 
0.317* 
(0.170) 
0.160 
(0.159) 
0.094 
(0.162) 
Place of origin (“Village” is a reference group): 
City, more than 1 mln pop -0.481* 
(0.255) 
-0.213 
(0.267) 
-0.792*** 
(0.247) 
-0.366 
(0.252) 
City, 0.5 to 1 mln pop -0.476** 
(0.204) 
-0.268 
(0.211) 
-0.172 
(0.196) 
0.442** 
(0.199) 
City, 0.25 to 0.5 mln pop -0.009 
(0.204) 
0.001 
(0.225) 
0.256 
(0.209) 
0.276 
(0.207) 
City, 0.05 to 0.25 mln pop -0.233 
(0.171) 
-0.036 
(0.190) 
0.071 
(0.172) 
0.527*** 
(0.172) 
City, 0.02 to 0.05 mln pop 
0.090 
(0.146) 
0.049 
(0.164) 
0.098 
(0.148) 
0.205 
(0.148) 
Small city 
0.060 
(0.163) 
0.055 
(0.184) 
-0.054 
(0.165) 
0.273* 
(0.165) 
Constant, threshold Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Link function Comp. Log-log 
Comp. Log-
log 
Comp. Log-log Comp. Log-log 
Goodness of fit, Pearson test p-value 1.000 0.014 0.072 0.000 
Cox&Snell Pseudo R^2 0.751 0.484 0.557 0.365 
 
Ordinal regression using PLUM procedure in SPSS. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  
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Table 4: PLUM regression estimation results (cont.) 
 
 
 Non-monetary Corruption  
Dependent variable 
  
Copying some parts 
of a course paper 
from the Internet, 
personal experience 
Copying 
somebody’s 
work during 
examinations 
or tests, 
personal 
experience 
Deceiving a 
professor 
while 
explaining 
problems 
associated with 
studies, 
personal 
experience 
Asking a 
professor for an 
individual 
treatment, 
personal 
experience 
Perception of the issue (scale variable) 
0.575*** 
(0.094) 
0.657*** 
(0.066) 
0.854*** 
(0.089) 
0.357*** 
(0.047) 
Formal ways of job search (scale 
variable) 
-0.011 
(0.097) 
-0.158** 
(0.063) 
0.040 
(0.098) 
-0.014 
(0.058) 
Negative attitude toward corruption 
(dummy variable) 
-0.357** 
(0.162) 
-0.296*** 
(0.106) 
-0.100 
(0.165) 
-0.192** 
(0.097) 
HiEd helps to get good education and 
good job (dummy variable) 
-0.362* 
(0.221) 
-0.222 
(0.148) 
-0.319 
(0.221) 
-0.196 
(0.130) 
Male Gender (dummy variable) 
0.143 
(0.174) 
-0.156 
(0.114) 
0.319* 
(0.179) 
0.177* 
(0.106) 
State stipend (dummy variable) 
-0.227 
(0.198) 
-0.069 
(0.132) 
-0.248 
(0.199) 
0.012 
(0.119) 
Income status of the family (“Enough for everything” is a reference group): 
Enough for food only  0.819 
(1.363) 
-0.354 
(0.836) 
-0.168 
(0.873) 
0.124 
(0.801) 
Enough for food and closing 0.191 
(0.459) 
0.227 
(0.300) 
-1.083** 
(0.482) 
-0.443 
(0.275) 
Not enough for durable goods 0.649* 
(0.356) 
0.427* 
(0.235) 
-0.487 
(0.173) 
-0.464 
(0.209) 
Enough for durable goods 0.447 
(0.344) 
0.168 
(0.227) 
-0.172 
(0.344) 
-0.229 
(0.201) 
How much do you spend monthly (housing not included)? (“More than 2000 UAH” is a reference group): 
Less than 1000 UAH 
-0.608* 
(0.346) 
-0.348 
(0.240) 
0.392 
(0.353) 
-0.194 
(0.204) 
Between 1000 and 1600 UAH 
-0.863** 
(0.339) 
-0.562** 
(0.235) 
0.276 
(0.343) 
-0.259 
(0.200) 
Between 1600 and 2000 UAH 
-0.214 
(0.378) 
-0.235 
(0.260) 
0.445 
(0.384) 
-0.247 
(0.225) 
Where do you live? (“Rent a flat” is a reference group): 
Dormitory 
0.440 
(0.306) 
0.291 
(0.198) 
-0.215 
(0.311) 
-0.147 
(0.188) 
With parents/relatives 
0.168 
(0.339) 
0.264 
(0.220) 
0.306 
(0.350) 
0.335 
(0.211) 
What was you External Independent Evaluation result? (“More than 700” is a reference group): 
Less than 500 1.698 
(1.359) 
0.267 
(0.858) 
1.997 
(1.318) 
0.230 
(0.770) 
Between 500 and 600 0.654* 
(0.362) 
0.405 
(0.250) 
-0.080 
(0.356) 
-0.242 
(0.213) 
Between 600 and 700 0.084 
(0.188) 
0.196 
(0.124) 
-0.236 
(0.192) 
-0.132 
(0.114) 
Do you work and, if yes, how many hours per day is you average working load? (“6-8 hours” is a reference 
group): 
Do not work -0.474 
(0.679) 
-0.699 
(0.498) 
-0.213 
(0.684) 
-0.229 
(0.407) 
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Less than 4 hours -0.769 
(0.715) 
-0.817 
(0.520) 
-0.529 
(0.722) 
-0.495 
(0.432) 
4-6 hours 0.022 
(0.706) 
-0.188 
(0.513) 
-0.134 
(0.710) 
0.037 
(0.421) 
Do not participate in an NGO or sport 
club dummy 
0.132 
(0.167) 
-0.080 
(0.110) 
0.048 
(0.172) 
-0.001 
(0.101) 
What are the most frequent marks you get at the university? (“Excellent” is a reference group): 
Satisfactory 
0.564 
(0.494) 
0.662** 
(0.328) 
1.583*** 
(0.515) 
0.555* 
(0.305) 
Between Satisfactory and Good 
-0.029 
(0.290) 
0.314 
(0.250) 
0.869** 
(0.414) 
0.550** 
(0.246) 
Good 
0.008 
(0.358) 
0.357 
(0.226) 
1.146*** 
(0.384) 
0.534** 
(0.227) 
Between Good and Excellent 
0.205 
(0.229) 
-0.033 
(0.211) 
0.444 
(0.366) 
0.422* 
(0.217) 
How many hours per day do you spend for self-study/homework/preparation to classes? (“More than 3 hour” 
is a reference group): 
None 
0.537 
(0.462) 
0.896*** 
(0.329) 
1.801*** 
(0.477) 
0.525* 
(0.279) 
Less than 1 hour 
1.195*** 
(0.329) 
0.959*** 
(0.219) 
1.441*** 
(0.341) 
0.557*** 
(0.199) 
1-2 hours 
0.981*** 
(0.264) 
0.793*** 
(0.167) 
0.776*** 
(0.280) 
0.278* 
(0.161) 
2-3 hours 
0.732*** 
(0.270) 
0.491*** 
(0.168) 
0.437 
(0.286) 
-0.008 
(0.166) 
Place of origin(“Village” is a reference group): 
City, more than 1 mln pop -0.102 
(0.407) 
-0.543** 
(0.263) 
-0.387 
(0.416) 
-0.891*** 
(0.255) 
City, 0.5 to 1 mln pop 0.112 
(0.331) 
-0.009 
(0.212) 
-0.700** 
(0.339) 
-0.314 
(0.201) 
City, 0.25 to 0.5 mln pop 0.526 
(0.350) 
0.184 
(0.230) 
0.222 
(0.352) 
0.160 
(0.208) 
City, 0.05 to 0.25 mln pop 0.348 
(0.288) 
0.396** 
(0.193) 
0.038 
(0.292) 
0.127 
(0.172) 
City, 0.02 to 0.05 mln pop 
0.396 
(0.250) 
0.251 
(0.162) 
-0.166 
(0.253) 
0.040 
(0.148) 
Small city 
-0.087 
(0.267) 
-0.016 
(0.178) 
-0.227 
(0.285) 
-0.056 
(0.168) 
Constant, threshold Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Link function Logit 
Comp. Log-
log 
Logit Comp. Log-log 
Goodness of fit, Pearson test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cox&Snell Pseudo R^2 0.190 0.374 0.314 0.298 
 
Ordinal regression using PLUM procedure in SPSS. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
